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The Fortress Economy: A Quantitative Framework for Trading Geopolitical Fragmentation

The Fortress Economy: A Quantitative Framework for Trading Geopolitical Fragmentation

Posted May 21, 2026 at 11:56 am

C.J. Sinclair
Vetta Research

Republished from Vetta Research blog https://vettaintech.com/.

Globalisation had a good run. For 30 years, the world’s supply chains were optimised for efficiency. Now they’re being rebuilt for resilience. That’s not a political observation – it’s a regime change, and regime changes are the most durable source of alpha in systematic investing.

TL;DR: The Investment Framework

The Problem: The global trading system is fracturing into competing economic blocs. Most quant models were built during the 1990–2020 globalisation supercycle and are systematically mispricing the transition.

The Signal: Three structural forces — reshoring capex, dollar erosion, and weaponised interdependence — are now measurable in the data and are not reverting.

The Opportunity:

  • $1.4 trillion in announced reshoring and nearshoring capex since 2022
  • Trade restrictive measures now outnumber liberalising measures by 4:1 globally (WTO, 2025)
  • USD share of global reserves has fallen from 72% (2001) to 58% (2025) — a structural, not cyclical, decline

The Investment Thesis:

  • BULLISH on domestic industrial beneficiaries: reshoring capex plays, energy independence infrastructure, supply chain software
  • BEARISH on geopolitically exposed multinationals with concentrated China revenue and fragile single-source supply chains
  • WATCH the dollar — a continued reserve share decline is the meta-signal for the entire regime

The Regime Change Nobody Wants to Admit Is Permanent

The Data Doesn’t Lie

Globalisation is not in retreat. It’s being replaced.

The WTO’s Global Trade Policy Fragmentation Index — which tracks the ratio of trade-restrictive to trade-liberalising measures — has crossed a threshold that historically marks a structural regime shift, not a cyclical downturn.

Here’s what the data shows:

  • 2000‒2008: Liberalising measures dominated. WTO accessions, tariff reductions, free trade agreements.
  • 2008‒2016: Roughly balanced. The post-GFC period introduced some friction but no sustained reversal.
  • 2017‒present: Restrictive measures have accelerated sharply. The US-China trade war, COVID-era supply chain nationalisation, the Russia-Ukraine sanctions cascade, and the CHIPS Act industrial policy wave have collectively produced a 4:1 ratio of restrictive to liberalising measures.
Global Trade Policy

Figure 1. The ratio of trade-restrictive to trade-liberalising measures has crossed a structural threshold. This is not a policy cycle — it is a regime change. Source: WTO Global Trade Alert Database (2025); author’s analysis.

That ratio matters.

When restrictive measures outnumber liberalising ones by 4:1, the marginal unit of global trade becomes more expensive, more uncertain, and more politically contingent. Supply chains that were optimised for cost are being re-optimised for resilience. That re-optimisation is capex-intensive, multi-year, and largely irreversible.

Why “It’ll Revert” Is the Wrong Model

The consensus view among macro strategists is that trade tensions are cyclical — that a change in US administration, a diplomatic breakthrough, or a recession-induced détente will restore the pre-2017 equilibrium.

This view is wrong for three reasons.

First, the domestic political economy of reshoring is now self-reinforcing. The CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act have created constituencies — workers, companies, local governments — with a direct financial interest in maintaining industrial policy. These constituencies vote.

Second, the security logic of supply chain diversification is bipartisan. The lesson of COVID-era PPE shortages and semiconductor supply disruptions has been absorbed across the political spectrum. No administration will voluntarily recreate the single-source dependencies that caused those crises.

Third, the data on corporate capex commitments is already locked in. Companies do not announce $50 billion semiconductor fabs and then cancel them because a trade negotiation goes well. The physical infrastructure of the new supply chain order is being built right now.

The Key Insight: This is not a trade war. It is a supply chain restructuring. Trade wars end. Supply chain restructurings take decades.


The Three Structural Forces

Force 1: The Reshoring Capex Wave

The numbers are staggering.

Since 2022, companies have announced over $1.4 trillion in reshoring and nearshoring capital expenditure globally. This is not government subsidy — it is private capital responding to a changed risk environment.

The breakdown by sector:

  • Semiconductors: TSMC Arizona (65B), IntelOhio(100B), Samsung Texas ($17B)
  • Electric vehicles: Ford BlueOval City (5.6B), GMUltium(7B), Rivian Georgia ($5B)
  • Pharmaceuticals: Eli Lilly US manufacturing ($9B), Pfizer domestic API production
  • Energy infrastructure: LNG export terminals, grid hardening, critical mineral processing
Reshoring

Figure 2. Reshoring capex has accelerated sharply since 2022 across all major geographies. The US leads in absolute terms; India and Southeast Asia are the fastest-growing nearshoring destinations. Source: Reshoring Initiative; fDi Intelligence; author’s estimates.

This capex wave has a long tail.

Construction timelines for semiconductor fabs run 3‒5 years. EV battery plants take 2‒4 years to reach full production. The capex commitments made in 2022‒2024 will be generating revenue — and driving demand for industrial equipment, construction services, and supply chain software — through 2028 and beyond.

The investment implication is straightforward: companies that supply the infrastructure of reshoring — industrial automation, construction materials, logistics software, domestic energy — have a multi-year demand tailwind that is largely independent of the economic cycle.

Force 2: The Dollar’s Structural Decline

The US dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves has fallen from 72% in 2001 to 58% in 2025.

That is a 14 percentage point decline over 24 years. It is slow. It is not a crisis. And it is structural.

Here’s why it matters:

  • Central banks are diversifying into gold, the euro, the renminbi, and — increasingly — CBDC-based settlement mechanisms
  • Commodity trade is increasingly being invoiced in non-dollar currencies (Saudi Arabia accepting yuan for oil, Russia-India trade in rupees)
  • BRICS+ expansion has explicitly positioned the bloc as a dollar-alternative settlement zone

Figure 3. The USD’s share of global reserves has declined structurally since 2001, while CBDC adoption has accelerated sharply since 2020. These trends are related: CBDC infrastructure enables non-dollar settlement at scale. Source: IMF COFER Database; Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker (2025).

This does not mean the dollar is collapsing.

It means the dollar’s structural premium — the “exorbitant privilege” that allows the US to borrow cheaply and run persistent deficits — is being gradually eroded. For systematic investors, this has three implications:

  • Commodity prices (priced in dollars) face structural upward pressure as the dollar weakens
  • Emerging market assets denominated in strengthening local currencies become more attractive on a hedged basis
  • Gold — the traditional reserve alternative — has a structural demand tailwind from central bank diversification

Force 3: Weaponised Interdependence

The most underappreciated structural force is what political scientists call “weaponised interdependence.”

The concept is simple: economic interconnection creates leverage. States that control critical nodes in global networks — financial systems, semiconductor supply chains, rare earth processing, undersea cables — can use that control as a coercive instrument.

The US demonstrated this with SWIFT exclusions and semiconductor export controls. China has demonstrated it with rare earth export restrictions and pharmaceutical API supply concentration. The lesson has been absorbed globally.

The result: every major economy is now actively mapping its critical dependencies and spending capital to reduce them.

The Chain Logic: Dependency mapping → Strategic vulnerability identification → Domestic production incentives → Supply chain diversification capex → Structural demand for reshoring beneficiaries

This is not a one-time adjustment. It is a permanent feature of the new geopolitical order.


The Quantitative Framework

Building the Regime Indicator

The fragmentation regime can be quantified using four observable variables:

VariableData SourceSignal DirectionCurrent Reading
Trade Restrictive/Liberalising RatioWTO Global Trade Alert>2.0 = fragmentation regime4.1 (regime confirmed)
Cross-border Capital Flow VolatilityBIS Quarterly ReviewRising = fragmentationElevated (2-year high)
USD Reserve Share (YoY change)  IMF COFERDeclining = fragmentation  -0.8pp YoY
Reshoring Capex AnnouncementsReshoring InitiativeRising = fragmentation  +34% YoY

Table 1. The four-variable fragmentation regime indicator. All four variables are currently in fragmentation-confirming territory.

When all four variables are in fragmentation-confirming territory simultaneously, the regime is robust.

We are there now.

The Four-Factor Stock Screen

Within the fragmentation regime, four factors have shown consistent alpha generation:

  Factor  Definition  Directional TiltAlpha (2022‒ 2025)
Domestic Revenue Concentration% of revenue from home marketLong (>70% domestic)  +4.2% annualised
Supply Chain Localisation Score% of inputs sourced domesticallyLong (>60% local)  +3.8% annualised
Reshoring Capex BeneficiaryDirect exposure to reshoring spend  Long  +6.1% annualised
China Revenue Concentration  % of revenue from ChinaShort (>30% China)+3.3% annualised (short)

Table 2. Four-factor alpha screen for the fragmentation regime. Alpha figures are estimated from factor portfolio backtests using Bloomberg data (2022‒2025). Past performance does not guarantee future results.

The reshoring capex beneficiary factor has the highest alpha.

This makes intuitive sense: companies with direct revenue exposure to the $1.4 trillion reshoring wave have a demand tailwind that is largely independent of the macro cycle and is not yet fully priced by the market.


Investment Strategies: Capturing Fragmentation Alpha

Bull Put Spread: Caterpillar (CAT)

Thesis: Caterpillar is the canonical reshoring capex beneficiary. Its construction and mining equipment is directly in the demand path of every major reshoring project — semiconductor fabs, EV battery plants, LNG terminals, grid infrastructure. The stock has pricing power, a strong backlog, and a domestic revenue profile that insulates it from the geopolitical risk facing its multinational peers.

Example Structure (Educational):

  • Sell 1 CAT $320 Put (90 days)
  • Buy 1 CAT $300 Put (90 days)

Profit Profile:

  • Max Profit: Premium collected (if CAT stays above $320)
  • Max Loss: 20 per share minus premium (if CAT falls below 300)
  • Breakeven: $320 minus net premium received

Bear Call Spread: Apple (AAPL)

Thesis: Apple generates approximately 19% of its revenue from China and manufactures roughly 90% of its products there. In a fragmentation regime, this dual concentration — revenue and supply chain — represents structural risk that the market has historically underweighted.

Example Structure (Educational):

  • Sell 1 AAPL $185 Call (90 days)
  • Buy 1 AAPL $200 Call (90 days)

Profit Profile:

  • Max Profit: Premium collected (if AAPL stays below $185)
  • Max Loss: 15per share minus premium (if AAPL rises above 200)
  • Breakeven: $185 plus net premium received

Risks & Challenges

Policy Reversal Risk

A major diplomatic breakthrough could temporarily reverse the fragmentation trend. The mitigant: even a significant policy reversal would not undo the physical capex already committed. Semiconductor fabs under construction do not stop because a trade deal is signed.

Crowding Risk

The reshoring theme has attracted significant capital since 2022. Factor crowding can cause sharp reversals even when the underlying thesis is correct. Monitor factor crowding metrics (short interest, institutional ownership concentration) for the key reshoring beneficiary names.

Execution Risk

Reshoring projects are complex, capital-intensive, and subject to cost overruns. Companies that miss reshoring project milestones will face significant stock-specific risk.

Model Risk

The fragmentation regime indicator is based on four observable variables. Systematic models should be monitored for regime-change signals and updated accordingly.


The Bottom Line

The global trading system is not broken. It is being rebuilt. And the rebuild is generating the most significant capex cycle in a generation.

For investors, the framework is clear:

  • LONG domestic industrial beneficiaries with direct reshoring capex exposure
  • SHORT geopolitically exposed multinationals with concentrated China revenue
  • WATCH the dollar — continued reserve share decline is the meta-signal for the entire regime
  • MONITOR the four-variable regime indicator for signs of reversal

The question for investors isn’t whether the world is fragmenting. The data has answered that.

The question is whether your portfolio is positioned for the world that’s actually being built — or the one that existed before 2017.


Sources & References

  1. WTO Global Trade Alert Database — Trade Policy Monitoring (2025): https://www.globaltradealert.org/
  2. IMF COFER Database — Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (Q4 2025): https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4
  3. Atlantic Council — CBDC Tracker (2025): https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/
  4. Reshoring Initiative — 2024 Annual Data Report: https://reshorenow.org/
  5. BIS Quarterly Review — Cross-Border Capital Flow Volatility (March 2025): https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2503.htm
  6. CEPR — The Geopolitics of Trade Fragmentation (2024): https://cepr.org
  7. McKinsey Global Institute — Geopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade (2023): https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy -and-corporate-finance/our-insights/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade
  8. US CHIPS and Science Act — Summary and Implementation Status (2025): https://www.commerce.gov/tags/chips-act
  9. European Commission — Net-Zero Industry Act (2024): https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en
  10. Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence.” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42‒79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
  11. Caterpillar Inc. — 2024 Annual Report: https://www.caterpillar.com/en/investors.html
  12. Apple Inc. — Form 10-K Fiscal Year 2024: https://investor.apple.com/investor-relations/default.aspx

Disclaimer: This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, or trading advice. The investment strategies discussed are hypothetical examples intended to illustrate concepts. Options trading involves substantial risk and is not suitable for all investors. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Consult with a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. The author may hold positions in securities mentioned.

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